Abstract. We consider scenarios in which two parties, each in possession of a graph, wish to compute some algorithm on their joint graph in a privacy-preserving manner, that is, without leaking any information about their inputs except that revealed by the algorithm's output. Working in the standard secure multi-party computation paradigm, we present new algorithms for privacy-preserving computation of APSD (all pairs shortest distance) and SSSD (single source shortest distance), as well as two new algorithms for privacy-preserving set union. Our algorithms are significantly more efficient than generic constructions. As in previous work on privacy-preserving data mining, we prove that our algorithms are secure provided the participants are "honest, but curious."
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate scenarios with two mutually distrustful parties, each in possession of a graph (representing, e.g., a network topology, a distribution channel map, or a social network). The parties wish to compute some algorithm on their combined graph, but do not wish to reveal anything about their private graphs beyond that which will be necessarily revealed by the output of the algorithm in question.
For example, consider two Internet providers who are contemplating a merger and wish to see how efficient the resulting joint network would be without revealing the details of their existing networks; or two transportation companies trying to determine who has the greatest capacity to ship goods between a given pair of cities without revealing what that capacity is or which distribution channels contribute to it; or two social networking websites wishing to calculate aggregate statistics such as degrees of separation and average number of acquaintances without compromising privacy of their users, and so on.
In this paper, we construct privacy-preserving versions of classic graph algorithms for APSD (all pairs shortest distance) and SSSD (single source shortest distance). Our algorithm for APSD is new, while the SSSD algorithm is a privacypreserving transformation of the standard Dijkstra's algorithm. We also show that minimum spanning trees can be easily computed in a privacy-preserving manner. As one of our tools, we develop protocols for privacy-preserving set union, which are results of independent interest.
We demonstrate that our constructions are significantly more efficient than those based on generic constructions for secure multi-party computation such as Yao's garbled circuits [39] . Some of the efficiency gain is due to our use of canonical orderings on graph edges. We believe that this technique may find applicability beyond the problems considered in this paper.
We prove that our constructions are secure in the semi-honest model. Assuming that a party correctly follows the protocol, there is no efficient adversary that can extract more information from the transcript of the protocol execution than is revealed by that party's private input and the result of the graph algorithm. Our choice of the semi-honest model follows previous work on privacy-preserving data mining such as Lindell and Pinkas' construction for a privacy-preserving version of the ID3 decision tree learning algorithm [28] , and constructions by Yang et al. for privacy-preserving classification [38] .
In general, the semi-honest model seems to be the right fit for our setting, where there is no realistic way to verify that the parties are submitting their true graphs as private inputs. The best we could hope for in the case of actively malicious participants is a protocol in which the parties first commit to their graphs, and then prove at every step of the protocol that their inputs match their commitments. This would greatly complicate the protocols without providing any protection against parties who maliciously choose their graphs in such a way that the result of the computation on the joint graph completely reveals the other party's input. We leave investigation of privacy-preserving graph algorithms in the model with malicious participants to future work. This paper is organized as follows. We survey related work in section 2, then present our definition of privacy in section 3 and our cryptographic toolkit, including a construction for private set union, in section 4. Section 5 contains the main results of the paper: privacy-preserving APSD and SSSD algorithms. Their complexity is analyzed in section 6. Conclusions are in section 7.
Related Work
This paper follows a long tradition of research on privacy-preserving algorithms in the so called secure multiparty computation (SMC) paradigm. Informally, security of a protocol in the SMC paradigm is defined as computational indistinguishability from some ideal functionality, in which a trusted third party accepts the parties' inputs and carries out the computation. The ideal functionality is thus secure by definition. The actual protocol is secure if the adversary's view in any protocol execution can be simulated by an efficient simulator who has access only to the ideal functionality, i.e., the actual protocol does not leak any information beyond what is given out by the ideal functionality. Formal definitions for various settings can be found, for example, in [6, 7, 22] .
Any polynomial-time multi-party computation can be done in a privacypreserving manner using generic techniques of Yao [39] and Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [23] . Generic constructions, however, are sometimes impractical due to their complexity. Recent research has focused on finding more efficient privacy-preserving algorithms for specific problems such as computation of approximations [18] , auctions [33] , set matching and intersection [20] , surveys [19] , computation of the k-th ranked element [1] and especially data mining problems such as privacy-preserving computation of decision trees [28] , classification of customer data [38] , and mining of vertically partitioned data [16, 37] .
The techniques we use in this paper are closely related to those previously used in the cryptographic version of privacy-preserving data mining, e.g., by Lindell and Pinkas in their privacy-preserving transformation of the ID3 algorithm [28] . We, too, use generic Yao's protocol [39, 29] as a building block. Yao's protocol can be implemented using efficient constructions for oblivious transfer [31, 32] and secure function evaluation [30] .
In this paper, we aim to follow the SMC tradition and provide provable cryptographic guarantees of security for our constructions. Another line of research has focused on statistical privacy in databases, typically achieved by randomly perturbing individual data entries while preserving some global properties [4, 2, 5, 3, 26, 12, 17] . A survey can be found in [36] . The proofs of security in this framework are statistical rather than cryptographic in nature, and typically permit some leakage of information, while supporting more efficient constructions. In this paradigm, Clifton et al. have also investigated various data mining problems [10, 24, 35, 25] , while Du et al. researched special-purpose constructions for problems such as privacy-preserving collaborative scientific analysis [14, 13, 34, 15] . Recent work by Chawla et al. [8] aims to bridge the gap between the two frameworks and provide rigorous cryptographic definitions of statistical privacy in the SMC paradigm.
Another line of cryptographic research on privacy focuses on private information retrieval (PIR) [9, 21] , but the problems and techniques in PIR are substantially different from this paper.
Definition of Privacy
We use a simplified form of the standard definition of security in the static semi-honest model due to Goldreich [22] (this is the same definition as used, for example, by Lindell and Pinkas [28] ). 
In such a case we write X c ≡ Y .
Suppose f is a polynomial-time functionality (deterministic in all cases considered in this paper), and π is the protocol. Let x and y be the parties' respective private inputs to the protocol. For each party, define its view of the protocol as (x, r 1 , m Definition 2. Protocol π securely computes deterministic functionality f in the presence of static semi-honest adversaries if there exist probabilistic polynomialtime simulators S 1 and S 2 such that
Informally, this definition says that each party's view of the protocol can be efficiently simulated given only its private input and the output of the algorithm that is being computed (and, therefore, the protocol leaks no information to a semi-honest adversary beyond that revealed by the output of the algorithm).
Tools
As building blocks for our algorithms, we use protocols for privacy-preserving computation of a minimum min(x, y) and set union S 1 ∪ S 2 .
In the minimum problem, the parties have as their respective private inputs integers x 1 and x 2 which are representable in n bits. They wish to privately compute m = min(x 1 , x 2 ). Because this problem is efficiently solved by a simple circuit containing O(n) gates, it is a good candidate for Yao's generic method [39] . An implementation of this functionality with Yao's garbled circuit requires 2 communication rounds with O(n) total communication complexity and O(n) computational complexity.
Privacy-Preserving Set Union
In the set union problem, parties P 1 and P 2 have as their respective private inputs sets S 1 and S 2 drawn from some finite universe U . They wish to compute the set S = S 1 ∪ S 2 in a privacy-preserving manner, i.e., without leaking which elements of S are in the intersection S 1 ∩ S 2 . We will define
In this section, we give two solutions for privacy-preserving set union: the iterative method, and the tree-pruning method. Both require communication and computational complexity that is logarithmic in u, provided s is small (note that even if we are not concerned about privacy, computing the set union requires at least O(s lg u) bandwidth, although it can be done in 1 round). Appendix B surveys several previously proposed techniques that can be used to compute the set union, but these techniques are all either linear in u (or worse), or do not fully preserve privacy.
Iterative method. The basic idea of the iterative method is to build up S one element at a time, from "smallest" to "largest." Before the protocol begins, both parties agree upon a canonical total ordering for the entire universe U . As a result, each element in U is given an integer label with lg u bits. In addition, we need a label representing ∞, for which can simply use the integer u + 1. The protocol proceeds as follows:
Step 1. Set S = ∅.
Step 2. P 1 selects m 1 as the canonically smallest element in S 1 , or sets m 1 = ∞ if S 1 = ∅. P 2 likewise selects m 2 as the canonically smallest element in S 2 , or sets
Step 3. Using a protocol for private minimum, P 1 and P 2 privately compute m = min(m 1 , m 2 ).
Step 4. If m = ∞, stop and return S. Otherwise, S = S ∪ {m} and the parties remove m from their input sets (it may be present in one or both). Then return to step 2.
The protocol preserves privacy because, given the output set S, a simulator can determine the value of m at each iteration. The protocol used for computing the minimum is private, so there exists an efficient algorithm that can simulate its execution to the party P 1 given its input and the output m (likewise for P 2 ). The simulator for the iterative method protocol uses the simulator for the minimum protocol as a subroutine, following the standard hybrid argument.
The iterative method protocol requires s + 1 iterations, and in each iteration the minimum of two (lg u)-bit integers is privately computed. Using Yao's method, this requires a circuit with 2 lg u inputs and O(lg u) gates. The 2 lg u oblivious transfers can all take place in parallel, and since Yao's method requires a constant number of rounds the whole protocol takes O(s) communication rounds. The total communication and computational complexity for the iterative method is O(s lg u).
Tree-pruning method. Before the tree-pruning protocol begins, the participants agree on a (lg u)-bit binary label for each element in the universe (note that a canonical total ordering would automatically provide such a label). The basic idea of the protocol is that the participants will consider label prefixes of increasing length, and use a privacy-preserving Bit-Or protocol (see appendix C) to determine if either participant has an element with that prefix in his set.
Initially, the single-bit prefixes "0" and "1" are set "live." The protocol proceeds through lg u rounds, starting with round 1. In the ith round, the participants consider the set P of i-bit "live" prefixes. For each prefix p ∈ P , each participant sets his respective 1-bit input to 1 if he has an element in his set with prefix p, and to 0 if he does not have any such elements. The participants then execute a privacy-preserving Bit-Or protocol on their respective 1-bit inputs. If the result of the Bit-Or protocol is 1, then p0 and p1 are set as live (i + 1)-bit prefixes. Otherwise, p0 and p1 are dead prefixes.
By a simple inductive argument, the number of live prefixes in each round does not exceed 2 · |S|, because an i-bit prefix p i = b 1 . . . b i can be live if and only if at least one of the participants has an element whose label starts with b 1 . . . b i−1 , and the number of such elements cannot exceed the total number of elements in the union, i.e., |S|.
In the last round (i = lg u), the length of the prefix is the same as the length of the binary labels, and the entire set P of live prefixes is declared to be the output S of the privacy-preserving set union protocol.
The tree-pruning protocol preserves privacy because, given the output set S, a simulator can determine the output of each of the Bit-Or protocols. As in the case of the iterative method protocol, we can construct a simulator for the tree-pruning protocol that uses a simulator for the Bit-Or protocol as a subroutine, and prove its correctness using a hybrid argument. The construction is simple and is omitted for brevity.
The tree-pruning protocol requires lg u iterations, and in each iteration the pairwise Bit-Or of at most 2s bits is computed. These computations can all take place in parallel, so the protocol requires O(lg u) communication rounds. Each iteration requires O(s) communication and computational complexity, so the entire protocol has complexity O(s lg u). Both the iterative method and tree pruning protocols have the same complexity, but different numbers of rounds. The iterative method requires fewer rounds when s = o(lg u).
Privacy-Preserving Algorithms on Joint Graphs
We now present our constructions that enable two parties to compute algorithms on their joint graph in a privacy-preserving manner. Let G 1 and G 2 be the two parties' respective weighted graphs. Assume that G 1 = (V 1 , E 1 , w 1 ) and G 2 = (V 2 , E 2 , w 2 ) are complete graphs on the same set of vertices, that is, V 1 = V 2 and E 1 = E 2 . Let w 1 (e) and w 2 (e) represent the weight of edge e in G 1 and G 2 , respectively. To allow incomplete graphs, the excluded edges may be assigned weight ∞. We are interested in computing algorithms on the parties' joint minimum graph gmin(G 1 , G 2 ) = (V, E, w min ) where w min (e) = min(w 1 (e), w 2 (e)), since minimum joint graphs seem natural for application scenarios such as those considered in section 1.
Private All Pairs Shortest Distance (APSD)
The All Pairs Shortest Distance (APSD) problem is the classic graph theory problem of finding shortest path distances between all pairs of vertices in a graph (see, e.g., [11] ). We will think of APSD(G) as returning a complete graph G = (V, E , w ) in which w (e ij ) = d G (i, j) and V is the original edge set of G. Here d G (i, j) represents the shortest path distance from i to j in G. This problem is particularly well suited to privacy-preserving computation because the solution "leaks" useful information that can be used by the simulator.
To motivate the problem, consider two shipping companies who are hoping to improve operations by merging so that they can both take advantage of fast shipping routes offered by the other company. They want to see how quickly the merged company would be able to ship goods between pairs of cities, but they don't want to reveal all of their shipping times (and, in particular, their inefficiencies) in case the merger doesn't happen. In other words, they wish to compute APSD(G) where G = gmin(G 1 , G 2 ).
The basic idea behind our construction is to build up the solution graph by adding edges in order from shortest to longest. The following algorithm takes as input the parties' complete graphs G 1 and G 2 . The graphs may be directed or undirected, but they must have strictly positive weight functions.
1. For notational convenience we introduce a variable k, initially set to 1, that represents the iteration count of the algorithm. Color each edge in E "blue" by letting B (k) denote the set of blue edges in the edge set E at iteration k, and setting ) 0 (e) = ∞. When the algorithm terminates after n iterations, we will have w 
and the respective private values
4. Now the parties privately compute the length of the smallest blue edge among all three graphs,
0 )), using a generic protocol for private minimum (section 4). This protocol does not reveal the larger value. 5. The parties form the following public set
and the respective private sets
By construction, S contain only blue edges.
6. First, the parties privately compute the set union
2 . This is done using the privacy-preserving set union algorithm from section 4. Next, the color of each edge e ∈ S (k) is changed from blue to red by setting
(e) otherwise (7) 7. Examine triangles with an edge e ij ∈ S (k) , an edge e jk ∈ R (k) , and an edge e ik ∈ B (k) . Define the weight function w 0 (e jk ). Do the same for triangles with an edge e ij ∈ R (k) , an edge e jk ∈ S (k) , and an edge e ik ∈ B (k) .
8. If there are still blue edges, go to step 3. Otherwise stop; the graph G
holds the solution to APSD(G).
The algorithm is proved correct in appendix A. The proof of privacy follows.
Proof (Privacy). We describe a simulator for P 1 ; the simulator is given P 1 's input to the protocol, x, and the output of the protocol, f (x, y) = G . The simulators are identical for P 1 and P 2 except for the asymmetry in the simulation of the set union and minimum subprotocols. We assume that simulators for the subprotocols exist because they are private protocols. For instance, if Yao's protocol is used then we can use the simulator in [29] . We will assume that there are n protocol rounds. The view of P 1 is
where RT m denotes the real transcript of the private minimum protocol, and RT u denotes the real transcript of the private set union protocol. We will show in later theorems that the output of each of these protocol executions can be computed by the simulator as a polynomial function of G , which we will denote as h m i (G ) and h u i (G ). We will also show that P 1 's input to each of these protocol executions can be computed as a polynomial function of x and G which we will denote as g m i (x, G ) and g u i (x, G ). The simulator can therefore use the subprotocol simulators as subroutines, producing the simulated transcript
where ST m and ST u denote the simulated transcripts of the minimum and union protocols, respectively.
We prove a hybrid argument over the simulated views for the minimum and set union protocols. First, define the hybrid distribution H i in which the first i minimum/union protocols are simulated and the last 2n − i are real. Formally, let H i (x, y) denote the distribution: , y) . For the sake of contradiction, assume the opposite, and choose i so that H i (x, y) c ≡ H i+1 (x, y). These two distributions differ in only one term, so there must be a polynomial-time distinguisher for either
However, this contradicts the privacy of the subprotocols, which implies that no such polynomial-time distinguishers exist.
We now show that for each execution of the set union and minimum subprotocols, P 1 's subprotocol input and the subprotocol output are computable as functions of P 1 's input and the output of the entire APSD protocol.
is efficiently computable as a function of G .
Proof. The edge weights found in
is the kth smallest edge weight in G .
Theorem 2 S (k)
Proof. S (k) is the set of edges in G with weight m (k) .
is efficiently computable as a function of G 1 and G .
Proof. m
is the smallest edge weight in G 1 that is > m (k−1) , allowing that m (0) = 0. This is because all edges with weight ≤ m (k−1) are in R (k−1) .
Theorem 4 S
Proof.
is the set of edges in G 1 with weight m (k) .
Private All Pairs Shortest Path
While there is only a single all pairs shortest distance solution for a given graph, there may be many all pairs shortest path solutions, because between a pair of points there may be many paths that achieve the shortest distance. As a side effect of engaging in the protocol described in section 5.1, the two participants learn an APSP solution. When defining the weight function w 0 (e ik ), then the shortest path from i to k is through j.
In step 6 of subsequent iterations, when adding an edge e ij ∈ S (k) to the set of blue edges, we can conclude that the shortest path from i to j is the edge e ij itself if e ij ∈ S (k) 0 , or is the shortest path solution as computed above if e ij ∈ S (k) 0 . Note that learning this APSP solution does not imply any violation of privacy, as it is the APSP solution implied by the APSD solution.
Private Single Source Shortest Distance (SSSD)
The Single Source Shortest Distance (SSSD) problem is to find the shortest path distances from a source vertex s to all other vertices [11] . An algorithm to solve APSD also provides the solution to SSSD, but leaks additional information beyond that of the SSSD solution and cannot be considered a private algorithm for SSSD. Therefore, this problem warrants its own investigation.
Similar to the protocol of section 5.1, the SSSD protocol on the minimum joint graph adds edges in order from smallest to largest. This protocol is very similar to Dijkstra's algorithm, but is modified to take two graphs as input. 
3. Using the privacy-preserving minimum protocol, compute
2 ). 4. Each party finds the set of blue edges in its graph with length m (k) .
(e si ) = m (k) }, and
Using the privacy-preserving set union protocol, compute
and a weight function w
(e) otherwise (11) 7. Similar to the APSD algorithm, form the weight function w
by fixing the triangles in w (k) 1 that violate the triangle inequality and contain edges in
2 . If there are still blue edges remaining, go to step 2. Otherwise stop; both parties now have a graph with each edge incident on s colored red, and with the weight of these edges equal to the shortest path distance from s to each vertex.
Minimum Spanning Tree
Suppose that two frugal telephone companies wish to merge. Each company has a cost function for connecting any pair of houses, and they want to connect every house as cheaply as possible using the resources available to the merged company. In other words, they wish to compute MST(gmin(G 1 , G 2 )). If they can perform this computation privately, then both companies can see the final result without revealing their entire cost functions. Both Kruskal's and Prim's algorithms for MST are easily turned into private protocols using our techniques, because the algorithms already consider edges in order from smallest to largest. At each iteration, Kruskal's algorithm adds the shortest edge such that its addition does not form a loop. It is a simple task for each party to compute the set of edges which would not form loops, and then to privately compute the length of the shortest edge in this set. One problem arises when there are multiple edges that share this length. In the shortest path algorithms, we addressed this issue by adding all edges of appropriate length at the same time using the private set union protocol, but this will not work for MST. Instead, we can assign a canonical ordering to the edges, and at each step find the shortest length edges that are canonically "first." This will allow a simulator to determine, given the final MST, in what order the edges arrived.
Complexity analysis
For each algorithm considered in this paper, we calculate the number of rounds, the total communication complexity, and the computational complexity, and compare them with the generic method. Using Yao's method on a circuit with m gates and n inputs requires O(1) rounds, O(m) communication, and O(m+n) computational overhead. Lindell and Pinkas note in [28] that the computational overhead of the n oblivious transfers in each invocation of Yao's protocol typically dominates the computational overhead for the m gates, but for correct asymptotic analysis we must still consider the gates.
Complexity of privacy-preserving APSD. For our analysis we will assume that the edge set E has size n, and that the maximum edge length is l. The generic approach to this problem would be to apply Yao's Method to a circuit that takes as input the length of every edge in G 1 and G 2 , and returns as output G = APSD (gmin(G 1 , G 2 ) ). Clearly, such a circuit will have 2n log l input bits. To count the number of gates, note that a circuit to implement Floyd-Warshall requires O(n 3/2 ) minimums and O(n 3/2 ) additions. For integers represented with log l bits, both of these functionalities require log l gates, so we conclude that Floyd-Warhsall requires O(n 3/2 log l) gates. To compute gmin requires O(n log l) gates, but this term is dominated by the gate requirement for Floyd-Warshall. We conclude that the generic approach requires O(1) rounds, O(n 3/2 log l) communication, and O(n 3/2 log l) computational overhead.
The complexity of our approach depends on the number of protocol iterations k, which is equal to the number of different edge lengths that appear in the solution graph. In iteration i, we take the minimum of two (lg l)-bit integers, and compute a set union of size s i . Because each edge in the graph appears in exactly one of the set unions, we also know that k i=1 s i = n. First we will determine the contribution to the total complexity made by the integer minimum calculations. If we use Yao's protocol, then each integer minimum requires a constant number of communication rounds, O(lg l) inputs, and O(lg l) gates, so the k calculations together contribute O(k) rounds, O(k lg l) communication complexity, and O(k lg l) computational complexity.
Complexity contribution of the set union subprotocols depends on whether we use the iterative method or the tree pruning method as described in section 4. If the iterative method is used, then the k invocations of set union require a total of O(n) rounds, O(k lg n) communication complexity, and O(k lg n) computational complexity. If the tree-pruning method is used, then O(k lg n) rounds are required, but the communication and computational complexity remains the same. The asymptotically better performance of the iterative method hides the fact that each of the k rounds requires O(lg n) oblivious transfers, which are considerably more expensive than the O(|s i |) private Bit-Or computations performed in each of the lg u rounds of the tree-pruning method.
Using the iterative method for set union, and noting that k = O(n), we conclude that our APSD protocol requires O(n) communication rounds, O(n log n + n log l) communication complexity, and O(n log n + n log l) computational complexity. As compared to the generic approach, we have traded more rounds for better overall complexity.
Complexity of privacy-preserving SSSD. Complexity of SSSD is similar to that of APSD, except that the number of rounds is k = O(v) and the total number of set union operations is v, where v is the number of vertices (O(e 1/2 )). We conclude that our protocol requires O(v) rounds, O(v(log v + log l)) oblivious transfers, and O(v(log v + log e)) gates. A generic solution, on the other hand, would require O(v 2 log l) oblivious transfers.
